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The Story of "the Court": A Narrative
Analysis of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
by NICHOLAS SHORT *

To some degree, we are all storytellers, and we tell stories for a
great variety of purposes: to animate speeches, to justify our conduct,
and even to explain our opinions and views. These stories, or
narratives, do a lot of work in human communication, and
understanding them is essential to understanding the people that use
them and the message they are attempting to send.
Because of the prevalence of narratives in everyday life, and
their explanatory power, it is perhaps not surprising to find narratives
being used even in more staunchly "academic" or "critical" contexts,
such as works of history, or Supreme Court opinions. Some may view
this connection skeptically: after all, writers of fiction tell stories, but
writers of history tell history, and Justices of the Court write
arguments and opinions. But narratives can be historical, and even
fictional narratives can be ideological and can be argumentative, at
least in the sense of being political.
While the terms "history" and "argument" allow us to see those
texts as more objective, more rooted in "truth," more "real" than a
dime-store novel, histories and arguments often rely on stories, or
narratives, and these narratives can be analyzed using the same tools
commonly used in literary theory to analyze fictional narratives. Such
analysis is structural in the sense that it focuses on the
interrelationship of certain narrative elements to interpret meaning.
In the context of a legal opinion, this structural analysis of a
narrative can, at the very least, complement more traditional legal
analysis, and might even draw attention to issues normally missed by
strict adherence to the latter approach.
J.D. Candidate 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.,
Astrophysics, B.A., History, 2002, University of California at Berkeley. I would like
to thank Professor David Hollinger for playing a guitar that gently weeps.
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Section IIIB of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey' provides an example of the use of historical
narrative in a judicial opinion. Section 1 of this paper will describe
and analyze Section IIIB of the Casey opinion, which presents a
narrative characterization of the Brown and West Coast decisions and
their precedents. The main purpose of this section is to describe and
summarize the major pieces of the Casey narrative. The secondary
purpose is to perform a traditional legal analysis of the citations in the
opinion, to question whether the text accurately represents the
proposition it is cited for, and where it does, to provide a broader
context for the proposition.
Section 2 of this paper will analyze the Casey narrative using the
literary theory of fictional narratives, and will attempt to interpret the
meaning of the narrative, not as a judicial opinion, per se, but as a
story about a special protagonist: "the Court." To avoid the criticism
that the analysis does not use a formal methodology rooted in
23
narrative analysis,2 I've used Gerard Genette's theory of narrative' as
a theoretical framework from which I approach some specific issues
of mood, voice, and order. The analysis in this Section is entirely
literary.
Section 3 will return to the realm of more traditional legal
analysis in order to situate the narrative within the context of the
Casey opinion's stare decisis analysis. Using Frederick Schauer's
theory of precedent for comparison,4 I will attempt to determine what
kind of argument from precedent the Casey narrative advances and
will attempt to connect, where possible, the legal criticism of this
portion of the opinion with the literary criticism of Section 2.
I. The Casey Narrative
In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court re-affirmed the basic holding
of Roe v. Wade5 after considering, among other things, "the rule of

1. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. For an example of such criticism, see Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology,64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 737, 741-41 (1997) (criticizing a collection of analyses of legal narratives for
not addressing methodological issues or discussing techniques specific to narrative
analysis).
3. GERARD GENETrE, NARRATIVE DISCOURSE: AN ESSAY IN METHOD (1980).
4. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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stare decisis."6 In doing so, the Court did more than just balance the
"prudential and pragmatic considerations" that customarily inform
7
the reexamination of a prior holding in "less significant" cases.
Motivated by the "sustained and widespread debate" about the Roe
decision, the Court went on to compare that precedent to two
decisional lines of "comparable dimension"" : those of Lochner v. New
York9 and Plessy v. Ferguson."
A. Lochner, Adkins, and West Coast Hotel
While the Court clearly considers this comparison of cases to be
part of its stare decisis analysis, the passage looks and reads more like
historical narrative than constitutional deliberation. The opinion first
sets the stage by describing the cases following Lochner, in general
terms, as imposing "substantive limitations on legislation limiting
economic autonomy in favor of health and welfare regulation."" The
opinion then raises, as a more specific example of this decisional line,
Adkins v. Children'sHospital of Districtof Columbia2 and West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish,3 the case that overruled Adkins 14 years later. 4
The Casey opinion then cites West Coast for the proposition that,
during the period of time between those decision, "the Depression
had come and, with it, the lesson that seemed unmistakable to most
people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom
protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally false factual
assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to
satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."' 5 The passage cited in West
Coast echoes some, but not all, of this language. The opinion argues
that "recent economic experience" offers an "additional and
compelling consideration" for overruling Adkins, and that the Court
"may take judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief which
arose during the recent period of depression.' 6 But those statements

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-846.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 861-870.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 861.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 861.
Id. at 861-62.
West Coast, 300 U.S. at 399.
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were made in the context of an argument that, in a welfare state such
as the New Deal society of 1937 America, "the taxpayers were called
upon to pay" the wages lost by impoverished workers in the absence
of minimum wage regulations. 7 That argument suggests that, as a
matter of fairness consistent with American values, the public should
not be asked to subsidize "unconscionable employers."' 8 But the
argument does not suggest that Adkins rested on "false factual
assumptions" about unregulated economies in general.
The narrative continues by referring to Adkins not as a case that
resolved a specific issue, but as a case that resolved a "social
controversy."' 9 However, as the story goes, the period of time
between Adkins and West Coast had proved the factual premises in
Adkins untrue, and "history's demonstration of their untruth not only
justified but required the choice of a new constitutional principle."'
Thus, the Casey opinion seems to be drawing two distinctions. First,
the "controversy" in West Coast seems to be in the question, and not
the decision, as Adkins is also portrayed as being controversial. Thus,
this characterization of these cases suggests that the Court is dealing
with, instead of generating, controversy.2
Second, the Court is drawing a distinction, which will be
repeated, between being justified and being required to reexamine
and overrule a prior opinion. This distinction has some basis in the
text of the West Coast opinion where Justice Hughes wrote, after
considering several factors that warranted reexamination22 , that these
factors made it "not only appropriate" but "imperative" to give the
case "fresh consideration., 23 This distinction, adopted in Casey,
portrays the Court as acting in these specific situations out of
obligation under the circumstances. The Casey opinion portrays
these specific decisions to overrule not as "justified," or within the

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862.
20. Id.
21. Concern about generating, instead of dealing with, controversy is a subtext of
Section IIIC which is concerned with the Court's legitimacy in the eyes of the public. See
Id. at 864-69.
22. The factors were "[tihe importance of the question, in which many States having
similar laws are concerned, the close division by which the decision in the Adkins case was
reached, and the economic conditions which have supervened, and in the light of which
the reasonableness of the exercise of the protective power of the State must be
considered." West Coast, 300 U.S. at 390.
23. Id.
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realm of permissible judicial behavior, but as "required,"
consistent with and mandated by judicial duty.

or

B. Plessy and Brown
The opinion then tells the story of the Court's struggle with
segregation and equal protection through the cases of Plessy v.
Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education." As the Casey opinion
tells it, the holding in Plessy, "that legislatively mandated racial
segregation in public transportation works no denial of equal
protection, '' " was motivated by the Court's understanding that
segregation does not stamp "the colored race with a badge of
inferiority."26 If segregation did so, it was "solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it. ' 27 The opinion quotes
the Plessy opinion directly for each of these propositions, and then
questions whether the Justices in fact believed this interpretation,28
citing Justice Harlan's famous dissent. The opinion later echoes this
skepticism about the Court's underlying motives by alluding to both
Adkins and Plessy as being based on "claimed justifications '' 29 instead
of legitimate belief, as if the arguments of those days are too far
fetched to believe that they were genuine.
The statements quoted from Plessy were made in the context of
two arguments. First, the Plessy Court argued that if blacks had
controlled the state legislature and had passed these same segregation
laws, those laws would not stamp whites with a badge of inferiority. 0
Second, the Plessy Court argued that the Equal Protection Clause
could only remedy civil and political, but not social, discrimination,
and that segregation of transportation was a type of social
discrimination which simply reflected the community's general
sentiment. 31 The portions of Harlan's dissent cited to argue that the
majority misjudged the central question, since the law infringes on the
liberty of black and white citizens alike should they choose to inhabit
the same train car.3' The dissent then argues that allowing such
24.

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 862.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (cited at Casey, 505 U.S. at 862).
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (cited at Casey, 505 U.S. at 862).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 862.
Id. at 863.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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legislation is a slippery slope, since the state can then legislate over
many other areas of "social" accommodations leading to truly absurd
results.33
According to the Casey opinion, the Court, in Brown, repudiated
the understanding that formed the basis of the majority's argument in
Plessy by addressing the "facts of life" in 1954, when it became clear
that "legally sanctioned segregation had just such an effect, to the
point that racially separate public educational facilities were deemed
inherently unequal."3
But it was not just the court's changed
understanding that justified the decision to overrule, since the ruling
was sought on the basis of "[s]ociety's understanding of the facts."35
Thus, the "Plessy Court's explanation", or reasoning, was so contrary
to the "facts apparent to the Court in 1954," and apparent to society
at large, that reexamination as in West Coast was not only justified,
but required. 6
C.

Synthesis
The unifying theme of both stories, according to the opinion, is
the Court's acceptance of changed facts, and changed understandings
of facts. The Brown and West Coast decisions did not embody the
"victories of one doctrinal school over another by dint of numbers,"
but showed the Court applying "constitutional principle to facts as
they had not been seen by the Court before."37 Additionally, in both
cases, society at large perceived these changes in facts, creating a
condition that did not justify, but required, a change in the law.38
Both cases are interpreted then as the Court catching up with the rest
of the country.39 But in contrast, the Court could not overrule Roe in
Casey because "neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central
holding" nor the Court's understanding of those facts had changed.'
Thus, a decision overruling Roe would not reflect the Court catching
33. Id.
34. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 864.
38. Id.
39. The opinion also characterizes the prior decisions as "comprehensible" and
"defensible," but these statements are geared towards the public, and the public's
acceptance of the judicial decisions, and hence they are more relevant to Section IIIC,
which is concerned with the Court's legitimacy, but which is not the subject of this paper.
See Id. at 863-64.
40. Id. at 864.
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up with the rest of the country, but would reflect the individual
dispositions to come out differently from
Justices' "present doctrinal
'
the Court of 1973."'
II. Analysis: Literary Theory
Another way of analyzing the story of Court history told in the
Casey opinion is to approach it as a narrative, using the tools of
fictional narrative analysis. Looking at the passage this way reveals a
story in which the protagonist, "the Court, ' 2 dominates the plot
through acts of speech, in the form of published opinions. The Court
acts, in the narrative, in various settings but always in the context of
scrutiny, either by commentators 3 or the more demanding attention
of the American public, who implicitly desire the Court to act in
conformity with their understanding of the nation in which they live."
Analyzing this narrative with the tools of literary theory reveals some
of the structural elements of this story. The meaning of the passage is
tied to these structural elements, and a literary analysis reveals these
interconnections in ways that complement more traditional legal
criticism, while also providing a fresh (and perhaps more fun) way of
looking at judicial writing.
Using Gerard Genette's text on narrative theory,45 I will analyze,
below, certain aspects of the Casey narrative associated with the
topics of mood, voice, and order. By way of background, Genette's
theory uses a specific definition of narrative, 6 and distinguishes
between three "aspects of narrative reality": the story, the narrative,
and the narration."7 Narrative, in Genette's work, "refer[s] to the
narrative statement, the oral or written discourse that undertakes to
tell an event or a series of events." 48 Narrative specifically refers to
"the discourse or narrative text itself" and is distinguished from both

41. Id.
42. More specific problems with determining the identity of the narrative's
protagonist, and the narrator, are addressed below in the section on "Voice."
43. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (introducing a law review article about Brown with "as
one commentator observed").
44. See Id. (mentioning "Society's understanding of the facts" and "facts that the
country could understand").
45. GENETrE, supra note 3.
46. Id. at 25-26.
47. Id. at 27.
48. Id. at 25.
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the events it recounts (or the underlying story), and the "producing
narrative action" (or the act of narrating).49
Also, as a preliminary matter, the grammar of the text creates an
initial problem with interpreting "the Court" as the protagonist, since
the actual opinions seem to conduct most of the action. For example,
focusing on the first part of the narrative alone, which deals with the
"cases identified with Lochner v. New York,"50 the reader finds these
opinions doing a variety of acts, as they impose limitations, adopt
theories, exemplify prior decisions or overrule prior decisions and
signal their demise, protect interpretations, and announce new
However, a statement of the form "Lochner
interpretations."
adopted... "can be interpreted as equivalent to a statement of the
form "the Court, in Lochner, adopted." The following analysis
assumes identity between such statements, so that the narrative's
protagonist is "the Court" and not the opinions themselves.
A. Mood: Distance

Under Genette's theory, mood describes a way of regulating
narrative information, and has two chief modalities: distance and
perspective. 2 A narrative regulates information by creating distance
when the narrative includes or excludes details from the underlying
story. 3 In contrast, a narrative regulates information through
perspective by adopting the point of view of a participant in the story,
thereby limiting the information available to that participant's
knowledge.M Here, I will address the use of distance in the Casey
narrative, and will address narrative perspective after analyzing
"voice" below.
In the Casey narrative, most of the acts or events that constitute
the plot of our story are acts of speech such as judicial opinions, law
review articles, and books.5 Where the narrated acts are speech acts,
we have a narrative of words (as opposed to a narrative of events)
49. Id. at 27.
50. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861.
51. Id. at 861-62.
52. GENETrE, supra note 3, at 162.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Other non-speech acts, such as the arrival of "the Depression," seem more geared
toward setting the scene or context in which the Court acts, though the heavily edited
representation of the Depression as harbinger of a lesson about contractual freedom also
creates distance from the underlying story of that complex event. Casey, 505 U.S. at 86162.
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under Genette's framework 6 Genette divides narratives of words
into three subcategories of increasing mimesis57 (or imitation) and
decreasing distance: narrated speech, transposed speech, and
reported speech.
These categories, which apply to fictional narratives, have ready
analogies to legal writing in judicial opinions, especially where that
writing takes up a narrative form. The third category of reported
speech is the most mimetic in that it most closely imitates the original
speech act, and thus seems closest to it.59 In the context of a Supreme
Court opinion, reported speech might look something like an
extended quote from a prior majority opinion, perhaps followed by
an extended quote from the dissent on the same point, thus
reproducing (though still narrating through reorganization) the
original "dialogue." In contrast, the first category, narrated speech, is
generally the least mimetic, the most reduced, and subsequently the
One example in the
most distant from the original speech act.'
context of a judicial opinion might be where an opinion announces a
paraphrased version of a prior holding that retains little to none of
the actual language of that holding. Transposed speech exists
somewhere between these extremes, seeming more mimetic than
narrated speech, but where "the narrator's presence is still too
perceptible in the very syntax of the sentence for the speech to
impose itself with the documentary autonomy of a quotation."6'
Generally, the Casey narrative regulates information by creating
distance between the narrative and the prior speech acts that form the
basis of the narrative. The Casey narrative utilizes direct quotation of
prior speech acts in only four instances. The first direct quotation is
the closest example of pure reported speech in the narrative. Here,
the narrator reproduces the words of Justice Jackson from his book
The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy62 after stating "Justice Jackson
The narrator sets the scene for the quote with some
wrote."
background information (Justice Jackson wrote the words before he

56. GENETTE, supra note 3, at 164-175.
57. In narrative discourse of fiction, mimesis is a term used to describe pure imitation
of the story that forms the basis of the narrative. See Id. at 162-63.
58. Id. at 171-175.
59. Id. at 172-73.
60. Id. at 171.
61. Id.
62. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862.
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joined the Supreme Court in 1937),63 but this is not transposition, per
se, and the form (Jackson said: "quote") strongly suggests narrated
speech. Here, the narrator allows one of our characters, Justice
Jackson, to speak in relatively unmodified form.
One other example of reported speech reveals an important
aspect of our protagonist's character: the potential to act, or speak, as
a matter of pretext. Later in the narrative, the narrator allows "the
Plessy Court" to speak about "the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's
argument" in that case." Here, the narrator does not say "the Plessy
Court said," but "the Plessy Court considered,"65 and "considered" is
used in the sense of "to believe."6 The narrator then immediately
characterizes this belief as suspicious, labeling the statement as "the
stated justification" regardless of "[w]hether, as a matter of historical
fact, the Justices... believed this or not." 67
Aside from these examples,6 most of the speech in the Casey
narrative is narrated or transposed speech. "The Court" generally
adopts theories, imposes limitations, and protects interpretations, or
overrules prior decisions, but mostly in the narrator's language.
Assuming the reader is familiar with the cases cited or discussed,
some of the language may seem similar to the actual language used in
the prior speech act, but even where that is the case, the narrator's
presence is still perceptible making the speech transposed but not
reported. Thus, the use of narrated and transposed speech in Casey
narrative creates distance, in the sense that "it says less, and in a more
mediated way." 69
B.

Voice

Because our narrative is historical, it avoids much of the
complexity present in some fictional narratives, which can use verb
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. In Genette's view, "the novelistic convention is that... [a character's] thoughts
and feelings are no different from speech, except when the narrator undertakes to
condense them into events and relate them as such." GENETTE, supra note 3, at 171.
Since the narrator does no such thing in the Casey narrative, the Court's beliefs are
equally part of the action in that they are no different from speech.
67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862.
68. The two other examples of reported speech (or direct quotation) occur where the
opinion quotes Black's law review article, and later in a parenthetical quotation following
a citation to Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 and 864.
69. GENETE, supra note 3, at 163.
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forms other than the past tense to create a variety of affects. ° Under
Genette's framework, the Casey narrative is a "subsequent
narrative," using the past tense, and specifically indicating the
temporal intervals between the time of narrating (June 29, 1992) and
the prior speech acts, which are all given dates.7' As the narrative
proceeds, "the length of the story gradually lessens the interval
separating it from the moment of narrating" suggesting a final
convergence of story-time and narrating-time."
In addition, since
"the narrator ["this Court"] is presented right away as a character in
the story.., final convergence is the rule." 3
Furthermore, the short length of the narrative (six paragraphs)
and the limited use of reported speech minimizes the effect of
narratives within narratives, or "narrative levels," to use Genette's
term.74 The judicial opinions that form the basis of the Casey
narrative also contain narratives themselves, and the reader catches a
glimpse of one such sub-narrative when the quote from Plessy
mentions "the plaintiff's argument., 75 These words remind the reader
that Plessy, and the other cases by analogy, were not simply holdings,
but holdings based on disputes involving people that had stories of
their own. But for the most part, these other narratives are washed
out by the use of reduction and narrated speech, or to briefly revert to
the language of legal analysis, the discussion of holdings and
interpretations of ideas, but not of "the facts of the case" or the
stories that motivated those holdings and interpretations. 6
Thus, issues of voice essentially boil down to the last of Genette's
three elements, that of "person." 77 Under Genette's framework, the
fundamental distinction of "person" is whether the narrator is present
or absent in the story the narrator tells.8 If the narrator is in fact
present in the narrative (as a character), then we can also distinguish
70. See Id. at 217 (describing prior/predictive, simultaneous, and interpolated
narrative moments).
71. Id. at 220-21.
72. Id. at 221.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 215.
75. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862.
76. In formal terms, this means that the Casey narrative is only an extradiegetic
narrative, and that there are no intradiegetic or metadiegetic narratives. See GENETrE,
supra note 3, at 228-29.
77. See Id. at 215. (analyzing voice in terms of three elements: time of narrative,
narrative level, and "person.")
78. Id. at 244-45.

488
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between cases where "the narrator is the hero of his narrative," what
Genette calls autodiegetic, and where "he plays only a secondary role,
which almost always turns out to be a role as observer and witness.""
A determination of narrative voice thus depends on a
determination of the narrator's identity, and the identity of the
protagonist. Up to now, I have assumed that the narrative's
protagonist is "the Court," though various pieces of the text
complicate that assumption in two ways. First, at any specific time,
the Court, at various moments in the narrative, seems to be both a
unitary institutional actor and a collection of non-united individuals.
Second, "the Court" seems to change in time, with previous courts
being distinctly different from later courts.'
For example, the narrator suggests early in the narrative that our
presumptively unitary actor, "the Court," is actually composed of
individual actors, or Justices, when the narrator mentions Justice
Holmes' dissent in Lochner,81 which characterizes the majority
opinion as "adopting... the theory of laissez-faire." ' However, in
the very next sentence, the narrator tells us that in Adkins, "this
Court held it to be an infringement of constitutionally protect liberty
of contract to require the employer of adult women to satisfy
minimum wage standards." 3 The language "this Court" suggests not
only a unitary institutional actor instead of individual actors (or an
interpretation compatible with the Court as being both), but also
identity between the Court and the narrator: it is not just "the" Court
that announced the holding, but "this" Court, i.e. the same Court that
is presently speaking.
The problem of determining the identity of our protagonist at
any given time (institution or individuals) is exacerbated by
differences between "Courts" (plural) of different times. The
narrator suggests this distinction when referring to "the Plessy
Court."' As mentioned above, it is useful to think of a sentence of
the form "Plessy adopted..." as equivalent to saying "the Court, in
Plessy, adopted..." since this avoids the problem of having opinions
79. Id. at 245.
80. I read temporal changes broadly to be inclusive of, but not exclusive to, changes
in the individuals that sit on the Court.
81. Another example occurs later, in the discussion of Plessy, when the narrator
mentions "the Justices in the Plessy majority" and references Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862.
82. Id. at 861.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 862.
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be individual actors themselves. However, the latter is not equivalent
to saying "the Plessy Court adopted" as grammatically, Plessy

modifies "the Court" and suggests a distinction between that Court
and others.
These issues also complicate determination of our narrator's
identity. Later in the narrative and closer to the point of final
convergence (where the story and the narrative meet in time), the
narrator says:
While we think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided...
we must also recognize that the Plessy Court's explanation for
its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the
Court in 1954 that the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this
ground alone not only justified but required.
Here, the narrator distinguishes between "the Plessy Court" and
"the Court in 1954" (instead of "the Brown Court), again suggesting

that "the Plessy Court" is somehow different, not only from the Court
of 1954, but from the narrator as well. The narrator also uses the
editorial plural, to use Genette's term, 86 to refer to itself (in the form
of "we"), which suggests multiple narrators. Later, the narrative
voice switches
back from the editorial plural ("our understanding") to
''
Court."
"the
However, for the most part the narrative adheres to the use of
"the Court" to describe the protagonist, and the moments of identity
between the narrator and the protagonist are stronger than the
deviations. Thus, the Casey narrative is essentially autodiegetic in
that the narrator, "the Court," is also our protagonist or central
character. Temporal changes can be partly explained by viewing the
narrative as semi-autobiographical. In such a narrative, while the
narrator is the same "person" as the central character, the narrator is
also a bit older and a bit wiser, and is authorized to treat the
protagonist "with a sort of condescending or ironic superiority., 8
The Casey narrative lends itself naturally to this description of growth
or maturity, with the forced distinction of "the Plessy Court" similar

85. Id. at 863.
86. See GENETrE, supra note 3, at 244.
87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 864 ("Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's
central holding nor our understanding of it has changed ... the Court could not pretend to
be reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition
to come out differently from the Court of 1973.").
88. GENETTE, supra note 3, at 252.
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to someone describing a part of their life that they would rather
forget. 89
Explaining the tension between individual and institutional
representation of our protagonist/narrator is more difficult. One
could stretch the analogy of "the Court" to a growing person by
suggesting that the variations among Justices at any one specific time
are like variations among personalities or "sides" of the individual.
However, this would leave our hero looking somewhat schizophrenic,
always debating with itself, and frequently speaking in dialogue (in
the form of majority and dissenting opinions). Another way to
reconcile the differences is to assume that "the Court" is always "the
majority" with dissenting (or even concurring) individuals somehow
momentarily not a part of "the Court," though they might be at some
later time. The Casey narrative lends itself more to this description, if
only because the narrative uses "The Plessy Court" as parallel to "the
Justices in the Plessy majority." 9 While this interpretation is most
consistent with the text, it has the drawback that the Court's identity
is tied to its acts of speech. Changes in time of the majority's
composition do not necessarily create problems in an autobiographical narrative, 9' but the Court does not seem to have a fixed
identity between acts of speech. Put another way, it is not clear who
the Court is between speech acts, and hence between the formation of
majorities.
C. Mood: Perspective

Under Genette's framework, narrative perspective is "the second
mode of regulating information [in the narrative], arising from the
choice (or not) of a restrictive 'point-of-view.'" '
Genette
distinguishes this element of mood from the "person" element of
voice by characterizing the former as asking "who is the character
whose point of view orients the narrative perspective" and the latter
as asking "who is the narrator." 93 Genette also groups, narrative

89. As another example of the narrator's state of greater maturity, the narrator
characterizes the Court of the Lochner and Adkins era as having "lack of prescience" and
"misperception." Casey, 505 U.S. at 862.
90. Id. at 863.
91. Such differences in composition are washed out by the fact that, whatever the
composition, its components speak united in the form of, or on behalf of, "the Court."

92.

GENETIrE,

93. Id. at 186.

supra note 3, at 185-86.
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perspectives, or focalizations, into three categories.94 The first
category is the nonfocalized narrative, "where the narrator knows
more than the character, or more exactly says more than any of the
characters knows [sic]." 95 The second category is internal focalization,
where "the narrator says only what a given character knows." 6 And
the third category is external focalization, where "the narrator says
less than the character knows." 97
Assuming identity between the narrator and the protagonist, and
a semi-autobiographical form, the Casey narrative employs a
nonfocalized perspective. The older and wiser Court that tells the
story seems to know more than the Court in its more previous stages,
as the narrator speaks with the benefit of hindsight. Thus, borrowing
from Genette's analysis of Proust,9" "[t]he narrator almost always
'knows' more than the hero, even if he himself is the hero." 99
However, while a nonfocalized perspective may be the natural
choice for telling a historical or autobiographical narrative, it is not
the only choice. While external focalization might sound odd in a
Supreme Court opinion,'0° internal focalization might be appropriate
in some circumstances, such as where the narrator chooses to show
the reader what "the Court" saw, or believed, or held, at a specific
time. An internal focalization in such a narrative (which has parallels
in legal and historical argument) would sacrifice the kind of teleologic
or interpretive approach used in Casey in order to show the Court
dealing with the problems of its day, according to, and in the context
of, what the Court "knew" then, and regardless of what the Court
"knows" now.
D. Order
In the same way that Genette distinguishes between the narrative
and the underlying story, his narrative theory also attributes a time to
94. Id. at 188-91.
95. Id. at 189.
96. Id.
97. Id. According to Genette, this third form was popularized by "Dashiell
Hammett's novels, in which the hero performs in front of us without our ever being
allowed to know his thought or feelings." Id. at 190.
98. MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST (Vintage Books 1982).
99. GENETTE, supra note 3, at 194.
100. Imagine a judicial telling of Court history that shows the Court acting in
seemingly incoherent ways, without the benefit of either the Court's own perspective, or
the perspective of a more knowledgeable character (such as our narrator, the older and
wiser Court).
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each (creating "story-time" and "narrative-time") and then looks for
"connections between the temporal order of succession of the events
in the story and the pseudo-temporal order of their arrangement in
the narrative."'' 1 An analysis of order in the Casey narrative reveals
the presence of a subordinate narrative with a separate story-line.
The narrative also makes dramatic use of another temporal effect,
that of ellipses, in the telling in both the first and the subordinate
narratives. The use of these devices is somewhat typical, °2 and while
they shed some light on the narrative's structure, they do not
necessarily provide any deep insight to the narrative's meaning.
However, they are of some interest if only because they reflect the
literary equivalent of problems, in legal analysis, associated with the
selection and ordering of chronological texts.
The Casey narrative employs, in the language of legal analysis, a
thematic rather than a chronological presentation, leading to the
presence of what Genette calls an anachrony.' °3
Focusing on
paragraphs 2-4, there are seven central speech acts (five Supreme
Court opinions and two outside commentaries) which occur in the
order of: Lochner, Adkins, West Coast, Justice Jackson's book, Plessy,
Brown, Black's article."° We can represent these narrative events
with the letters A through G. The corresponding years for those
events, which are provided in the narrative, are: 1905, 1923, 1937,
1941, 1896, 1954, 1960.'05 Assuming the order of the underlying story
is chronological, then the narrative events occur in the order 2, 3, 4, 5,
1, 6, 7, so our combined narrative-story order is A2, B3, C4, D5, El,
F6, G7.
The only odd-duck in this ordering is Plessy (El), which
constitutes a type of anachrony called analepsis, or an "evocation
after the fact of an event that took place earlier than the point in the
story where we are at any given moment.' 1 6 At the point in the
narrative corresponding to Justice Jackson's opinion about the New
Deal Court (D5), we are in the. year 1941, and the narrator harkens
back to 1896 to tell us about Plessy, before moving forward with

GENETrE, supra note 3, at 35.
102. See Id. at 36 (describing anachrony, such as beginning in media res, as "one of the
traditional resources of literary narration").
103. Genette defines anachrony as "all
forms of discordance between the two temporal
orders of story and narrative. Id. at 40.
104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-63.
105. Id.
106. GENETTE, supra note 3, at 40.
101.
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Brown in 1954. If the narrative revolving around the Lochner "line of
cases"' is the "first narrative," the subordinate narrative told in the
Plessy analepsis is a "mixed analepsis, whose reach goes back to a
point earlier and whose extent arrives at a point later than the
beginning of the first narrative."' ' The analepsis is also complete
since it not only rejoins the first narrative where it left off (1941) but
surpasses the first narrative and proceeds 13 years into the future with
the Brown decision (1954). 1w In fact, the narrative does not need to
address the problem, perhaps more common in fictional narratives, of
joining the analepsis with the first narrative since it simply skips over
this entire time period and advances to a point far beyond where the
narrator left off.
The lack of any attempt to join the narratives also suggests that
the analepsis is also "heterodiegetic" in that it deals "with a story
line ...

'0
different from the content ... of the first narrative."11

Outside of the overlap in time, where the first narrative actually fills a
temporal gap left by the subordinate narrative, the protagonist seems
to be doing something distinctly different from before. To analogize
to some hypothetical epic, its as if our hero starts a battle that would
last 58 years, leaves after 9 years to start and pursue another different
battle that takes 32 years to finish, and then returns to the first battle,
which then takes another 17 years to finish.
The drama of this hypothetical epic is also severely condensed, as
the narrator only shows the protagonist acting at the initiation and
denouement of each battle. This use of space, both implicitly and
explicit-as when the narrator explicitly indicates the gap by using a
transition such as "[f]ourteen years later""'-is what Genette
describes as ellipsis,"' and its extensive"3 use adds to the reader's

perception, created in part by the ordering of events, that this
abbreviated story covers large periods of time with little attention to
details. In short, the Casey narrative uses a kind of "bookend"

narration that omits everything between the beginning and the end of
107. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861.
108. GENETrE, supra note 3, at 49.
109. Id. at 62.
110. Id. at 50.
111. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861.
112. According to Genette, ellipsis is as a "leap forward without any return, [and] is
obviously not an anachrony but a simple acceleration of the narrative." GENE-FrE, supra
note 3, at 43.
113. Extensive in the sense of being used in both the first and subordinate narratives,
and covering large time periods in each instance.
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a story line, between Adkins and West Coast, and between Plessy and
Brown, and thus shows the protagonist only acting in decisive
moments.
E.

Summary

Much of the literary analysis of the Casey narrative has
analogues to questions raised in more traditional legal analysis. To
say that the narrative creates distance from the underlying story-in
the sense of saying "less, and in a more mediated way""-through
use of narrated and transposed speech is also to comment on the
extent to which an author has remained true to the original language
of a text (functioning as evidence) or has added her own gloss.
Similarly, the use of ellipsis to omit large periods of time suggests, in
parallel, the omission of potentially relevant details (which may be
difficult to deal with) in favor of a broader narrative that reflects the
author's interpretation of the events.
Furthermore, to say that the narrative is autobiographical and
nonfocalized is also to comment on the fairness, or accuracy, of
interpreting Supreme Court opinions of the past with the language
and ideas of the present. To notice heterodiegetic analepsis is to
question the validity of a thematic, textbook presentation of cases
which ignores the potential influence of doctrinal developments in
areas outside of the "chapter heading" and to question, more broadly,
the way judges or historians order events that occurred
chronologically, but connect in more complex, anti-chronological
ways. And last, to question the identity of "the Court" as a
protagonist, and as a narrator, is to raise similar legal questions about
the degree to which the Supreme Court is simply an exercise in
building consensus amongst individual judges with their own political
and ideological influences, or whether the Court represents
something more fixed, less dynamic, and less subject to external
influence.
That is not to say that the different forms of analysis raise the
same questions, but simply to say there are analogies between the two
approaches. And where a judicial opinion narrates court history in a
similar fashion, the two analyses may be complementary to each
other, in the sense that the literary approach provides another
perspective (and for most legal types, a novel perspective) from which
to observe somewhat familiar problems.

114.

GENETrE,

supra note 3, at 163.
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III. Stare Decisis
By discussing Brown and West Coast in the midst of an analysis
about Roe's power as precedent, the Casey opinion suggests that
these cases are, in some abstract sense, precedent for the decision.
However, it is not clear, at first blush, what cases dealing with
minimum wage laws for women and segregated educational
institutions have to do with a case about abortion.
That is not to say that these cases aren't often mentioned in the
same breath. In the opening to his renowned article about Lochner,
Cass Sunstein proclaimed that "[c]onstitutional law tends to define
itself through reaction to great cases"'' 5 before mentioning Brown,
Roe, and Lochner as examples of such cases. Those same three cases
makeup three of the five subjects in a book entitled "Great Cases in
Constitutional Law.", 116 Similarly, the Court in Casey links Roe with
Brown and West Coast on the basis of their controversial nature,
describing them together as cases of "comparable dimension that
17
have.., taken on the impress of the controversies addressed.", 1
Thus, these cases are connected by the fact that many people know
about them and may struggle to deal with them, but such a
connection does not explain their utility in a stare decisis analysis on
the issue of abortion.
One thing Brown and West Coast have in common, apart from
their controversial nature and their status as part of the U.S. Supreme
Court's "greatest hits" catalog, is that they overruled prior decisions
of equal controversy. This is the central commonality the Court is
addressing in Casey in order to determine whether the Court should
follow suit and overrule Roe, but it is surprising, nevertheless, that the
Court engaged in such a discussion in the first place. After all, there
is no similar discussion in either West Coast or Brown. In fact, neither
of those cases really make much of precedent8 or stare decisis at all, at
least when compared to the Casey decision.1

115. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (1987).
116. GREAT CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Robert P. George ed., Princeton
University Press 2000).
117. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861.
118. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 389-90 (listing factors that require
reexamination of Adkins). To the extent the Brown opinion dealt with precedent, it did so
in the more traditional fashion of stating the case and providing a distinction. See Brown,
347 U.S. at 491 (distinguishing Plessy on the ground that it involved public transportation
and not education).
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Thus, the Casey opinion is distinct from these cases not only
because it uses a narrative in addition to an analytical presentation of
prior court decisions, but also because this narrative is based on cases
that, under a traditional stare decisis analysis, are completely
irrelevant. According to Frederick Schauer's theory of precedent,
"reasoning from precedent.., presupposes an ability to identify the
relevant precedent" and thus depends on an organizing theory, or
rules of relevance.' 9 If that's the case, then the Court, in Casey,
adopts an extremely broad rule that makes a case relevant not on the
basis of its specific facts alone, but also on the basis of broader
contextual facts: specifically, the fact of whether the decision-maker
of a prior time was faced with a controversial precedent and a plea to
overrule in contravention of the rule of stare decisis. The remainder
of this paper will address issues created by this type of reasoning,
using Schauer's theory of precedent as a basis for comparison.
A. Correctness of Result
One essential characteristic of the Casey Court's view of stare
decisis is the focus on a prior decision's reasoning, and the current
decision-maker's perception of the prior decision's correctness. A
theory of stare decisis need not have these characteristics. For
example, under Schauer's theory, "a pure argument from
precedent.., depends only on the results of those [prior] decisions,
and not on the validity of the reasons supporting those results."'12 An
appeal to precedent, then, is an appeal to invoke the holding of a
prior case and not the reasoning, and such an appeal necessarily
ignores the present decision-maker's view about the correctness of
that reasoning: "[o]nly if a rule makes relevant the result of a
previous decision regardless of a decisionmaker's current belief about
the correctness of the decision do we have the kind of argument from
precedent routinely made in the law and elsewhere., 121 As a result,
precedent can have no "weight" since "precedent is always followed
or distinguished" and "[w]e never face a situation where a precedent
presumptively ought to be followed, but some special overriding
condition in this case leads us not to follow it.,,122
The Casey Court's approach differs from Schauer's theory in that
the Casey Court acknowledges a third option, where precedent is not
119.
120.
121.
122.

Schauer, supra note 4, at 576-78.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id. at 594
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always followed or distinguished, but can also be overruled. In such
cases, the opposing party's response to the invocation of relevant
precedent is not that the current scenario is somehow distinguishable,
but that the prior decision is no longer valid. In Casey, the Court is
principally concerned with such cases, and plainly recognizes the
importance of a decision's "correctness" in conducting a stare decisis
analysis in this context. The opinion cites Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co.123for the proposition, "repeated" in Supreme Court case law, that
"a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and
above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.', 124 Thus,
while a belief that a prior decision is wrong is not dispositive, under
this theory, it is relevant.
However, the parenthetical quote from that Mitchell citation
qualifies the Court's definition of a "wrong" result: "[a] basic change
in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership
invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different
from the two political branches of the Government.' ' 125 A "wrong"
result, then, is not a result based on faulty reasoning, but a result
immediately influenced by politics and personal belief. A wrong
result is, simply, a result that changes with Court membership. In
such cases, the Court reexamines prior case law solely on the basis of
"a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently.' ' 126 This
really gets at the heart of the plurality's theory of stare decisis: to
justify overruling a prior decision, something must change other than
the people voting. The difficulty lies in articulating the nature of that
special something.
The Court's definition of wrong as politically motivated, or
reflecting present doctrinal disposition, also relates to the literary
discussion of our protagonist's identity. The Casey narrative used
"the Court" to suggest something permanent and fixed about the
protagonist, that while the Court could go through "phases" of
misperception or lack of prescience, the Court of the Adkins and
Plessy eras was still, somehow, the same Court narrating in the Casey
opinion. Variations from use of "the Court"-such as the presence of
individual Justices dissenting with the Court / the majority, and labels
used to distinguish between Courts of different time periods (as in
"the Plessy Court")-undermined the reader's perception of the
123.
124.
125.
126.

Mitchell v. W.T. Grant. Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (cited at Casey, 505 U.S. at 864).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 636 (cited at Casey, 505 U.S. at 864).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
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protagonist as having a fixed identity. Thus the literary analysis
seems to get at a related question: what is it that "the Court" does
that is fixed, and not subject to the vascillations of individuals or
time?
B. Constituional Change and Living Constitutionalism

The "correctness" of a prior opinion occurs in one more place in
Section IIIB of Casey, when the Court states: "we think Plessy was
wrong the day it was decided." '27 Based on the Court's subsequent

description of wrong as politically motivated, this statement may
mean that Plessy was wrong not for bad reasoning, but because that
decision shows Supreme Court Justices succumbing to the external
political pressures of their times, or to their own "unjustified" beliefs.
The decision may be wrong not because of its premises or
conclusions, but because the judges were exhibiting bad behavior,
behavior that undermines the traditional notion of the Court as an
institution insulated from the vascillations of politics by lifetime
tenure and a sworn commitment to follow precedent.
Professor Jack Balkin has proposed an alternative interpretation
of this statement: that it reflects an expression of our "ethos or
national character." ' 2 According to Balkin, Plessy "follows fairly
naturally from the Supreme Court's 1883 decision in Pace v.
Alabama, which upheld provisions of a state code that punished
interracial cohabitation more severely than cohabitation between
persons of the same race."12 9 Michael Klarman has argued, along

similar lines, that "Plessy-era race decisions were plausible
interpretations of conventional legal sources" and that the decisions
can be criticized, "but not on the ground that they butchered clearly
established law or inflicted racially regressive results on a nation
otherwise inclined to favor racial equality."
If, as these arguments
suggest, the Plessy Court applied precedent in a fairly straightforward
manner and did not succumb to external political pressures, then the
Casey Court's attempt to characterize Plessy as wrong, in its day, must
have a different motivation. According to Balkin, "we say that a case
like Plessy was wrong the day it was decided in order to avoid

127. Id. at 863.
128. Jack M. Balkin, 85 B.U.L. REV. 677, 710 (2005).
129. Id. at 707.
130. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO

CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 9-10 (2004).
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concluding that we are the type of people whose Constitution would
say such a thing. 131
But the statement is also important in the context of the Casey
opinion because the plurality did not say the same thing about
Lochner, which may suggest that the Casey Court thinks that case was
rightly decided in its context. Should a theory that explains why the
Supreme Court overrules a case differentiate between cases that were
rightly and wrongly decided in their day? According to Balkin, the
answer is 'yes', and has important ramifications for the argument
made to justify overruling precedent.132 In Balkin's view, decisions
can be overruled, but to overrule a case that was initially decided
correctly (in its context) implicates a different argumentative
burden.133 In such cases, "the burden is not simply to show why the
usual norm of stare decisis does not apply... [but] to show how the
meaning of the Constitution itself has changed in the interim."' 3 In
other words, Balkin argues:
one needs a theory of Living Constitutionalism,... a theory that

argues that the best interpretation of the Constitution's meaning
changes in accordance with changing circumstances and events, and
that it is the duty of all actors, including judges, to change their
interpretations of the Constitution to reflect these changing
circumstances.'
Section IIIB of the Casey opinion provides some evidence that
the plurality holds such a view, suggesting that the theory of
precedent articulated in Casey may reflect a desire to meld more
traditional theories of stare decisis with the idea of a living
constitution. The Court emphasizes that Brown and West Coast
overruled Plessy and Adkins because of changed facts, or changed
understandings

of facts. 136

The Court also states

that

"[i]n

constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed
circumstances may impose new obligations" and that the decisions to
'
overrule these cases sprang from the "Court's constitutional duty. 137
If the language of changed circumstances does not, by itself,
indicate the influence of living constitutionalism on the Court's
131.
132.
133.
134.

Balkin, supra note 128, at 710.
Id. at 697-99.
Id. at 697-98.
Id. at 698

135.

Id.

136. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863.
137. Id. at 864.
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opinion, the language of duty tips the scale. When we think of
judicial duties, the one that most immediately springs to mind is the
duty to follow precedent that judges commonly recite in Senate
confirmation hearings, not the duty to overrule cases when
circumstances have sufficiently changed. This idea, that judges are
not only empowered to overrule prior decisions but have a
constitutionally imposed obligation to do so under certain
circumstances, is strongly suggestive of a worldview of living
constitutionalism, and is a key component of the Court's somewhat
progressive theory of precedent articulated in this case.
Thus, the Casey opinion strives to articulate a theory of stare
decisis that explains not only the cases where the Court decided
wrongly in its day, but also those cases where the Court decided
rightly in its day, and yet something fundamental still has changed and
makes that decision presently wrong now. In this context, that
something is not a change or deviation from the Court's fixed role,
but a broader change in the world, or audience, to which the Court
announces its decisions. The deference to the correctness of prior
decisions in their context, advocated by Balkin and Klarman, is
somewhat analogous to a literary argument that a nonfocalized
narrative treats "the Court" of previous times somewhat judgmentally
and condescendingly. Such arguments might advocate the equivalent
of internal focalization in fictional narratives, where it seems more
fair to look at the Court's acts of speech through the eyes of the Court
at that time, knowing what the Court knew then, and disregarding
what the Court knows, or believes, now.
C. Facts and Values

Another distinct characteristic of the Casey Court's approach to
stare decisis lies in its uniquely broad definition of the relevant
"facts." On a basic level, stare decisis is an argumentative device that
seeks to create consistency in outcome between specific fact patterns.
Schauer describes the "bare skeleton of an appeal to precedent" as:
"[t]he previous treatment of occurrence X in manner Y constitutes,
solely because of its historical pedigree, a reason for treating X in
manner Y if and when X again occurs.', 3 8 When we discuss the

relevant facts in an appeal to precedent, we are normally talking
about the specific facts surrounding "occurrence X," and when we
compare current fact scenarios to prior judgments, we base that

138. Schauer, supra note 4, at 571.
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comparison, by necessity, on the facts as selected and presented in
that prior opinion.139
The Casey opinion reconciles cases which overrule precedent,
such as West Coast and Brown, with the principle of stare decisis
largely by invoking an expansive definition of the word "facts." As
described above, one of the narrative's principal themes is that
Supreme Court Justices have certain judicial obligations in the face of
changed facts. According to the opinion, cases like Lochner and
Adkins rested on "fundamentally false factual assumptions about the
capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of
In cases like West Coast Hotel, the Court
human welfare.""'
recognized that "the facts of economic life were different from those
previously assumed.''. And in Brown, the Court addressed the
"facts of life" which indicated that segregation created inequality."'
But while a stare decisis argument typically focuses on "the facts
of occurrence X," the plurality in Casey reads "facts" more broadly as
"the facts of life," encompassing what might just as fairly be described
as values. For example, a false "factual assumption" about an
unregulated economy's ability to protect the poor might equally be
characterized as an individual value judgment that the poor should
protect themselves, or that government welfare, and not regulation of
individual employment contracts, should guarantee a minimum
standard of living.
Much of the language in both West Coast and Brown suggests
that those Courts were not solely motivated by changed facts, in the
narrow sense of that word. Justice Hughes opinion, in West Coast,
speaks generally about liberty before focusing on the idea of liberty
of contract.14 3 He describes constitutional liberties as limited, and
then defines liberty as "liberty in a social organization which requires
the protection of law against the evils which menace the health,
Employers, and
safety, morals and welfare of the people."' "
especially those who practice the "sweating system," are portrayed as
"evil" (a word used five more times in the opinion), "unscrupulous

139. Unless the current decision-maker took part in the prior decision (horizontal stare
decisis, close in time), remembers the decision, and has a different perception of the facts
than that presented by the majority opinion.
140. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-62.
141. Id. at 862.
142. Id. at 863.
143. West Coast, 300 U.S. at 391.
144. Id.
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and overreaching," and "unconscionable.' 45' Their female employees,
on the other hand, are portrayed in terms of class and victimization
(no doubt, in some part, because of the gender bias evident elsewhere
in the opinion):
The legislature of the State was clearly entitled to consider
the situation of women in employment, the fact that they are in
the class receiving the least pay, that their bargaining power is
relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of those
who would take advantage of their necessitous circumstances.46
And in one strikingly bald assertion of opinion, Justice Hughes
states "[t]he bare cost of living must be met.' 41 7 Without engaging in a
metaphysical debate about whether these statements represent facts,
factual presumptions, or values, these statements, at the very least,
indicate that much more than changed facts motivate the holding in
West Coast.

A similar case can be made in Brown, which is based on two
conclusions: that public education is of such importance that it "is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms," and that
racial segregation, even where tangible factors are equal, generates "a
feeling of inferiority" that irreparably affects the "hearts and minds"
of children.
Chief Justice Warren cites no authority for the first
proposition, 9 and for the second proposition, he cites a host of thencontemporary works of psychology and social science.5 The Casey
plurality might portray the first argument as based on common
knowledge about the benefits of a public education, but one might
equally characterize the argument as based on American cultural
values about education, generally. A similar case could be made for
the second argument, as it seems somewhat counterintuitive to
characterize a conclusion about people's feelings as fact, in the
narrow sense of the word.
Thus, the West Coast and Brown decisions were not solely
motivated by changes in "the facts of the case" (the narrow sense of
the word), but the Casey opinion overcomes this difficulty by
interpreting "facts" much more broadly. That the word "facts" is
doing some of the work of values is evident in the Court's

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494 n.11.
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characterization of facts as widely understood. At several points, the
Court indicates that the commonality, and popularity, of knowledge is
a key characteristic of the type of "facts" which the plurality believe
warrant the obligation to overrule a prior decision. On this point, the
Casey Court may be taking a cue from the Court in West Coast, which
argued that "it is unnecessary to cite official statistics to establish
what is of common knowledge through the length and breadth of the
land."''
In comparison, the Casey Court speaks of lessons "that
seemed unmistakable to most people," of "[s]ociety's understanding
of the facts," and of "facts that the country could understand". 2 In
support of their interpretation of the West Coast decision, the Casey
plurality cites Justice Jackson's book, The Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy, for the proposition that "'the older world of laissez faire
was recognized everywhere outside the Court to be dead. '"5 53 To
support their interpretation of Brown, the plurality cites a law review
article for the proposition that the question in Brown "'has meaning
and can find an answer only on the ground of history and of common
knowledge about the facts of life in the times and places aforesaid."' 54
The Casey Court's dissolution of the division between facts and
values is not, of itself, problematic, except for the rhetorical effect.
The choice of describing these shifts as changes of facts instead of
values is a choice that favors an "objective" over a subjective
characterization of judicial decision-making. This choice reflects the
continuing tension between traditional principles of stare decisis and
the idea of a living constitution prevalent in the Casey opinion, and
similarly, in literary terms, the tension between representing the
Court's speech acts as chaotic expressions of individual opinion or as
more united expressions of a single actor.
D. Doctrine and Ideology
Another notable aspect of the Casey approach to stare decisis is
its focus on the specific decision to overrule, and the omission of any
consideration of the decisions made in the interim. In literary terms,
the narrator's use of ellipses omits large periods leaving the reader
curious as to the Court's actions during this time, and the potential

151. West Coast, 300 U.S. at 399.
152. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-63.
153. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 85 (1941) (cited in Casey,
505 U.S. at 862).
154. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 427 (cited at Casey, 505 U.S. at 863)
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relationship of such omitted actions to the narrative. The result of
this approach is that the narrative ignores the potential effect of the
development of judicial ideologies or doctrines, and Barry Cushman's
analysis of the New Deal Court "5 is one example of an argument that
reveals this affect. Barry Cushman has argued that the series of cases
between Lochner and West Coast Hotel'56 shows the Court struggling
to deal with three differing lines of economic due process doctrine:
the regulation of prices, wages, and hours of employment.'57
Cushman looks within these lines for judicial development of
doctrinal principles, including: the principle of neutrality, the public /
private distinction, constitutional takings, liberty of contract,
federalism, the level of scrutiny of judicial review, and notions of
categorical police power.'58

I do not wish to comment substantively on Cushman's analysis,
here, except to note that his argument stands for the proposition that
the omitted cases may reveal the development of different ideological
approaches, or doctrinal schools, within the Court. This would
undermine the Casey Court's assertion that cases such as West Coast
do not represent the victory "of one doctrinal school over another by
'
dint of numbers."159
But it may also indicate, more generally, that
narratives of Supreme Court history are structurally predisposed to
minimizing the development of ideological schools where those
narratives make extensive use of ellipsis to omit intervening acts.
E. Conclusion
A narrative analysis of the Casey narrative reveals certain

structural characteristics that control that passage's meaning. Such an
analysis may also reveal more general problems endemic to any
narrative that takes, as its subject, the story of "the Court," and while
a literary analysis does not raise the same questions as more ordinary
legal analysis, it raises related, or analogous questions, and can thus
provide a fresh perspective on those questions.
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